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FAMILY LEAVE POLICIES TRUMP STATES'
RIGHTS: NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN RESOURCES v. HIBBS AND ITS
IMPACT ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
JURISPRUDENCE
JANA L. TIBBEN*
I. INTRODUCTION

In late May 2003, the top headline of the Chicago Tribune
proclaimed, "Court bolsters family leave: Justices reject
stereotypes; say states not exempt from U.S. law."1 The headline
referred to the United States Supreme Court case Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,' which held that states
could be sued in federal court for money damages for violating the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).3 While Hibbs likely failed to
cause the average reader pause, for legal scholars it was a
surprising deviation from the pro-states' rights path of the
Rehnquist Court over the last seven years.
The Eleventh Amendment denies federal courts jurisdiction

*
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like to thank my editor David Hall and Professors Samuel Olken and Donald
Beschle for sharing their time and insight into this topic. Thanks also to Sean
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1. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Bolsters Family Leave, CHI. TRIB., May
28, 2003, § 1, at 1. The more recent headlines in sovereign immunity describe
the case currently pending before the Supreme Court: Tennessee v. Lane, No.
02-1667. The issue in Lane is whether Congress has the power to abrogate
the states' immunity for violations of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. American Association of People with Disabilities News,
Advocates Call for "Access to Justice"in Tennessee v. Lane and Jones (Jan. 12,
2004) at www.aapd.com/docs/laneadvocall.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
Though this Comment does not fully analyze Lane, the author predicts that
the Lane Court will create a distinction between congressional abrogation of
states' immunity under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection and
rule against Tennessee.
2. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
3. Id.; Greenburg, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism:Pretext Review of MeansEnd Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 408 (2003) (citing the Court's
invalidation of six federal statutes since 1997).
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over claims against a state.5 This Amendment is central to an
understanding of Hibbs, because plaintiff Hibbs named the state
of Nevada a defendant in a federal court, which the Eleventh
Amendment seems to expressly prohibit, yet he prevailed before
the Supreme Court.6 This Comment will evaluate the significance
of Hibbs, given the history of the Eleventh Amendment, and
attempt to determine the policies underlying the Rehnquist
Court's recent Eleventh Amendment decisions.
Part I of this Comment will briefly explain relevant
provisions of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, while
analyzing underlying public policy. Part II will examine Hibbs,
and the problems with the Court's earlier sovereign immunity
decisions, which Hibbs avoids. Part III evaluates a constitutional
amendment, conditional spending measures, and working within
the current framework as potential remedies for these problems.
Part III also argues that Hibbs is a well-grounded decision because
it imposes minimal costs on employers, and entitles 4.8 million
state employees to legal remedies nearly equal to those of their
private sector counter-parts. Part IV then presents several
recommendations intended to balance states' rights with federal
protection of the rights of individual citizens.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Eleventh Amendment: The Lawyer's Amendment 7
The phrase "sovereign immunity" is noticeably absent from
the plain text of the Eleventh Amendment.8 The notion of
sovereign immunity derives from the English common law belief
that "the king can do no wrong."9 Given the American belief that
only the People are sovereign, this notion has suffered an
awkward translation into American democracy. °
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
6. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972.
7. Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States' Rights, the New Federalism, the
New Commerce Clause, and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 OLKA. CITY U.L.
REV. 869, 909 (2000). Rotunda suggests that this label comes from the ability
of a skilled lawyer to conquer Eleventh Amendment objections with "form"
over "substance." Id. at 909 n.203. See also infra note 18 and accompanying
text (discussing ways around the Eleventh Amendment).
8. The Eleventh Amendment reads, "The judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
9. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996) (Stevens,

J., dissenting) (critiquing the English underpinnings of sovereign immunity).
10. Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment within three weeks of the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), which
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Technically, the Eleventh Amendment operates as a
jurisdictional bar on federal courts' ability to entertain suits when
the state is a named defendant." The Court's principle-based
sovereign immunity, in contrast, is a more encompassing doctrine
that a defending state may invoke to free itself from prospective
monetary judgments in both state and federal courts."
held that an action of assumpsit could lie against Georgia.
ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 395 (3d ed. 1999). Scholars and
current Supreme Court Justices have debated at length whether the Eleventh
Amendment applies only to diversity jurisdiction, or whether it extends to
federal question jurisdiction as well. Id. at 396. The Rehnquist majority
applies the Eleventh Amendment to both cases. Id. The dissenters, in
contrast, believe it only applies to diversity jurisdiction, because it was passed
to undo the Chisholm decision, which was founded on diversity jurisdiction.
Id.; see also infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing the proper
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
11. Defining the "state" is itself an issue in sovereign immunity cases. See
Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico a state for statutory purposes). Courts broadly
construe "states" to include the "arm[s] of the states." See Raygor v. Regents
of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 536 (2002) (noting that a state university can
be construed to be an "arm of the State"); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (finding a statechartered savings bank entitled to sovereign immunity protection); Lake
County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 393, 406
(1979)
(finding an agency created by two states to coordinate land
development, and the individual members of that agency, immune from suit);
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S. C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1867 (2002)
(finding a state-run port immune from administrative proceedings). John T.
Noonan, Jr., a senior Judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, points out
that a wide range of activities are immune from review under such a broad
definition of "state." JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S
POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES, 167-68 (2002). For

instance, California state agencies immune under the Eleventh Amendment
include: the Barbering and Cosmetology Program; the California School for
the Blind; the California School for the Deaf; the Horse Racing Board; and the
lottery. Id. But see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 28081 (1977) (finding an Ohio public school board not an arm of the state, based
on Ohio law defining "state" to exclude "political subdivisions," despite its
dependence on state funds and its power to issue bonds and levy taxes).
Immunity does not extend to municipalities, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756
(1999), or counties, Lincoln Co. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
12. Justice Rehnquist refers to it as "the Eleventh Amendment, and
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 95 (referring to sovereign
immunity as "judge-made law," as opposed to a constitutional mandate). The
majority in Alden reasoned that, "[t]o rest on the words of the Amendment
alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we have
rejected." Alden, 527 U.S. at 730 (1999). Justice Kennedy further concluded
that the Constitution was silent on the issue of sovereign immunity in state
court because "no one, not even the Constitution's most ardent opponents"
believed the Constitution would require states to defend themselves in their
own courts. Id. at 741.
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The Justices in the Rehnquist Court who typically dissent in
sovereign immunity decisions (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) generally argue for a strict constructionist's interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment."
They argue the Eleventh
Amendment only deprives federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction when a state is a defendant sued by a citizen of a
different state." Only recently have these Justices accepted the
stare decisis of the Court's equation of principle-based sovereign
immunity with the Eleventh Amendment.15
The tug-of-war over the "proper" interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment began as early as 1890 in Hans v.
Louisiana.6
The Hans Court understood the Eleventh
Amendment to bar federal courts from hearing suits against a
state by its own citizens, reasoning that it would be "anomalous"
to treat citizens who sue their own state differently than citizens
of one state who sue another state.17 In the last one hundred
years, the Supreme Court has carved out some significant
exceptions to the general immunity principle. 8 Still wrestling
with the text of the Eleventh Amendment a century after Hans,
the Supreme Court held in Alden v. Maine9 that this Amendment
bars suits brought by a citizen against her state in state court,
0
despite the Amendment's silence on this matter."
13. See generally dissents in cases discussed infra note 22.
14. See generally dissents in cases discussed infra note 22.
15. See dissents in cases discussed infra note 22, in contrast with dissent in
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1986-94 (displaying a break with earlier discussions as to the
proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
16. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
17. Id. at 10.
18. There are several ways around the Eleventh Amendment. A state can
consent to be sued or be found to have waived its immunity, though courts are
reluctant to find such a waiver. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
274 (1997). The federal government can sue an unconsenting state in federal
court. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71. In 2000, the federal government
brought suit under the Americans with Disability Act and the ADEA in about
two percent of cases filed. Brent W. Landau, State Employees and Sovereign
Immunity: Alternatives and Strategies for Enforcing Federal Employment
Laws, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 194-95 (2002). Also, though the state is the
real party in interest, a citizen can get an injunction against a state officer, in
his or her individual capacity, "even when the remedy will enjoin the
implementation of an official state policy." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at
412. Finally, when a private citizen names a state official as a defendant, a
federal court can award prospective, though not retroactive, relief. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 656-59 (1974).
19. 527 U.S. at 706.
20. Id. at 712. The Alden Court began its analysis by reviewing the
Eleventh Amendment's history and Congress' outrage over Chisholm. Id. at
719-25. In response to Congress' fierce reaction to Chisholm, the Court wrote,
"we have looked to 'history and experience, and the established order of things'
...rather than 'adhering to the mere letter' of the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
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B. The New Federalism: A Streak of 5-4 Decisions
The Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions are part of
"the new federalism": a trend toward increasing states' rights,
while minimizing Congress' power to regulate the states." Recent
sovereign immunity decisions," most of which were decided 5-4,
are similar in that the Supreme Court, pursuant to Marbury v.
Madison,' has continually asserted itself as the final voice in
constitutional interpretation of Congress' ability to subject the
states to monetary civil judgments. 4 In the past seven years, the
Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against
states under the following statutes:
the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 5 the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 6 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,27 the Trademark Act of
1946,6 the Violence Against Women Act,' the Gun Free School

at 727 (citations omitted).
21. President Richard Nixon proposed a "new federalism" in 1969 by
saying: "It is time for a New Federalism in which power, funds, and
responsibility will flow from Washington to the states and to the people."
Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism- An American
Tradition: Modern Devolution Policiesin Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227,
288 (1996). The two most significant themes of the new federalism are a
"reverence toward state sovereignty and protectiveness toward traditional
state functions." Daniel A. Farber, Symposium: Reflections on United States
v. Lopez: The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on New
Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 618
(1995). New federalism appears to have evolved gradually from Rehnquist's
majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
which held that the federal government intruded upon the states' sovereignty
when it entitled state employees to a federal minimum wage. Id at 852. See
Farber, supra, at 618.
22. See generally Marine Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1864; Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden, 527 U.S. at 706;
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 44.
23. 5 U.S. at 137 (1803).
24. See cases cited supra note 22. The Court's consistent 5-4 opinions
reflect the dissent's hesitancy to apply stare decisis in sovereign immunity
cases. At one point a dissenting Justice seemed to suggest that if given the
opportunity, he would overrule Seminole Tribe. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98-99
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing, "The kind of judicial activism manifested in
cases like Seminole Tribe ... represents such a radical departure from the
proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity
arises").
25. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
26. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
27. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66.
28. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 668.
29. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605.
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Zones Act,3" the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, 1 the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act," the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,33 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,"4 and the Americans with Disabilities Act."5
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas
broadly construe the Eleventh and Tenth Amendments, and
narrowly construe Congress' power to regulate the states under
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.36 These
Justices reason that the states' sovereign immunity is grounded in37
the states' dignity as co-equal players in our federal system.
They envision the states functioning as laboratories of democracy,
able to conduct unique social experiments that fit with the culture
of their constituencies. 8 These Justices fear the tyranny of the
federal government, and insist that the states retained certain
traits of sovereignty upon the ratification of the Constitution.3 9
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
31. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 631.
32. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 666.
33. Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-12.
34. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66.
35. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.
36. See id. (holding that employees of the state of Alabama may not sue the
State for the State's failure to comply with Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
37. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad
powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in
a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation." Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
38. This idea originates with Justice Brandeis, who wrote:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
chose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise
of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason,
we must let our minds be bold.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
39. The Alden Court noted that the states would not have ratified the
Constitution if it meant jeopardizing their status as sovereigns. Alden, 527
U.S. at 727. The states were heavily indebted from the Revolutionary War
and feared being haled into court on those debts. CHEMERINSKY, supra note
10, at 391. The belief in states' immunity was also present among the
Founding Fathers, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, "It is inherent in the nature
of sovereignty not to be amendable to the suit of an individual without its
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They see similarities between the English and American historical
legal traditions of upholding state-based immunity.' Though it is
rarely explored in their published opinions, these Justices' position
avoids placing excessive financial strain on the states, as an
immune state does not sacrifice its time and administrative
resources to lawsuits, and its treasuries are protected from hefty
civil judgments. 4'
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, on the other
hand, typically in dissent, acknowledge the pervasiveness of the
social ills that prompted congressional action, and emphasize that
Congress should not be on a short leash in remedying these socioeconomic problems."
These dissenters assert that states
sometimes fail to protect their citizens' civil liberties, and that
Congress is entitled to require state compliance with federal law.'
C. Whittling Away at CongressionalPower: The Court Ends
Congress'Ability to Abrogate States' Immunity through the
Commerce Clause, and Narrows the Scope of Congress'Power to
Abrogate Immunity Pursuantto Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment
One cannot understand the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence
without
understanding
Congress'
role
in
determining when a state can be sued.
1. Congress Cannot Act Through the Commerce Clause to Abrogate
the States' Sovereign Immunity
In the 1996 decision Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,"

consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 2 (Alexander Hamilton).
40. In England the King could not be subject to suit in his own court.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 142 (1984).
Immunity in England was extended to the King's subjects since the King, it
was believed, would never sanction unlawful behavior. Id.
41. Framed in terms of competing fiscal policies, the question in a sovereign
immunity case becomes this: who will pay, the injured party or the taxpayers?
The Court fully acknowledged the policy of protecting state treasuries in
Edelman v. Jordan, when it reasoned that an award of retroactive employee
benefits violated the Eleventh Amendment due to its unexpected impact on
the general revenue of the State of Illinois. 415 U.S. 651, 667-69 (1974).
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Hibbs also mentions the states' interest in their
"fiscal integrity." Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. at 1986.
42. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 381-88 (outlining such an argument). Justice
Breyer writes, "it is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies a
'minimum 'rational-basis' review' to statutes that burden persons with
disabilities, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those
same individuals." Id. at 387-88 (internal citations omitted).
43. See cases cited supra note 22 (making this argument in dissent).
44. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole Tribe expressly overruled the plurality
opinion of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which the Court
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the Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause, or other Article
I powers, are not valid means of abrogating state sovereign
immunity. 45 The Seminole Tribe Court believed that the courts'
Article III power to decide "cases or controversies" was limited by
the Eleventh Amendment, and that Congress could not use Article
I to change this relationship.46 The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, was adopted after the Constitution was in place, and
must be read as altering the pre-existing balance of power. 7 The
Court's sovereign immunity decisions since Seminole Tribe
consistently reaffirm this reasoning. 8
2. An Increasingly Narrow Reading of Congress' Section 5 Powers
Section 5 incorporates by reference Section 1, the substantive
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 One of the first cases to
clarify Section 5 powers in relation to state sovereign immunity
was Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. ° The plaintiffs in Fitzpatrick, employees
of the state of Connecticut, argued that Connecticut's
discriminatory retirement policies violated Title VII of the Civil

just six years earlier held that Congress' use of Article I was a valid means of
abrogating state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
Seminole Tribe left open the question of how Congress can require states'
compliance with federal law outside abrogating their immunity.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 444. It also left open the question of how to
determine when Congress is acting under its Commerce Clause powers, as
opposed to its Section 5 powers. Id. Thus, attorneys asking the Supreme
Court to uphold congressional abrogation of a state's immunity now argue a
statute was passed under Section 5, even if it has substantial effects on
commerce. ContrastMorrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (discussing Congress' power to
pass the Violence Against Women Act under both the Commerce Clause and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ultimately invalidating
provisions of the Act on Section 5 grounds) with Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (invalidating an Atlanta motel's racially
discriminatory renting policy solely on Commerce Clause grounds, avoiding an
analysis of Congress' Section 5 powers to enact the same legislation).
45. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
46. Id. at 72-73.
47. Id. at 59.
48. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (affirming
Seminole Tribe's reasoning).
49. The text reads, "Congress shall have the power to enforce by
appropriate legislation the substantive provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. Section 1 reads, in part,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Id. § 1.
50. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Justice Rehnquist interpreted the
Rights Act of 1964."'
Fourteenth Amendment as transferring power from the states to
Congress, 52 labeled Congress' Section 5 powers "plenary, " ' and
held that Congress had the power under Section 5 to authorize
suits against a state.5
Though not an Eleventh Amendment case, the 1966 case of
Katzenbach v. Morganu also contributed significantly to an
understanding of "appropriate" Section 5 legislation. The issue in
Morgan was whether Congress could use its Section 5 powers to
enact section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
prohibited the enforcement of New York's discriminatory voting
laws.' The Voting Rights Act (VRA) declared that anyone who
had finished the sixth grade could not be denied the right to vote,
regardless of his or her competency in the English language.57
Prior to the VRA, New York had conditioned the right to vote on a
basic understanding of English, which precluded many Puerto
Rican immigrants living in New York from voting.'
In upholding the Voting Rights Act, the Court took a very
broad, deferential view of Congress' Section 5 powers,59
characterizing Section 5 as a "positive grant of legislative power, ",6
which permitted Congress to use discretion in ascertaining the
types of legislation necessary "to secure the guarantees of the
Exemplifying judicial restraint,
Fourteenth Amendment."6 '
Justice Brennan wrote, "It was for Congress, as the branch that
made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting
considerations." 2
51. Id. at 448.
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 456.
54. Id.
55. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
56. Id. at 646-47.
57. Id. at 643-44.
58. Id. at 644.
59. Id. at 650. Echoing McCulloch v. Maryland, Justice Brennan wrote,
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons
the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection
of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power.

Id.
60. Id. at 651.
61. Id.
62. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653. The considerations were: the breadth of
the discrimination at issue, the effectiveness of state law to combat that
discrimination, the presence of alternate means to remedy the discrimination,
and the state's interests in requiring English literacy. Id. The Court also
looked to the McCulloch v. Maryland standard to determine what constitutes
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The Morgan Court's Section 5 dictum was later restricted by
the 1970 plurality opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell.' In Mitchell, the
Court struck down those parts of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 that created state and local voting
requirements, while affirming Congress' authority to set age and
residency requirements for national elections.' Seven Justices in
Mitchell concluded that Congress does not have an unchecked
license to determine the substantive provisions of the Equal
Protection Clause, thereby restricting Congress' Section 5 power
more than Morgan did four years earlier. 5
The Court's deferential interpretation of Congress' Section 5
powers in Morgan ended in the 1996 case of City of Boerne v.
Flores.' The plaintiff in Boerne was the Catholic archbishop of
San Antonio, who sued the City of Boerne for denying him a
building permit. 7 The archbishop and his parish had determined
that it was necessary to expand their church facilities to meet
their congregation's growing population.'
Earlier, however, the
City of Boerne had passed an ordinance that allowed the church to
be declared an historic landmark.69 The archbishop sued, alleging
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provided him
relief.7 ° The Court disagreed.71 Finding the RFRA inappropriate
'appropriate" legislation under Section 5.

Id. at 650.

This three-part

standard asked: whether the legislation enforces the Equal Protection Clause,
whether it is "plainly adapted to that end," and whether it is true to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution. Id.
63. 400 U.S. 112 (1970); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.3 (3d

ed. 1999)..
64. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117-18.
65. ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 63, at 10.

66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Boerne does not mention the Eleventh
Amendment because plaintiff Manuel Flores sued the City of Boerne, yet it is
significant, like Morgan, for its definition of Congress' Section 5 powers. Id. at

532.
67. Id. at 512.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Congress passed the RFRA to make laws truly neutral to religion,
after finding that some supposedly "neutral" laws burdened religious
minorities by making them conform to the majority culture. Id. at 515. The
RFRA required the government to demonstrate a "compelling justification" for
burdening religious minorities. Id. Congress passed the RFRA in response to
the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Id. at 512. The plaintiffs in Smith were Native Americans who were denied
unemployment benefits after being fired for ingesting peyote as part of a
Native American ritual. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The Smith court ruled that a

democratic government is not required to accommodate all religious practices,
even if some religious minorities suffer. Id. at 890. The Boerne Court also
referenced its 1963 opinion, Sherbert v. Verner, "To make an individual's

obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
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Section 5 legislation, the Court concluded that Section 5
legislation must be remedial in nature, and cannot be used to
enlarge citizens' rights."2 Justice Kennedy eschewed Congress'
reliance upon "anecdotal evidence" as a basis for creating the
RFRA's broad, substantive right for all persons to be free from the
laws of the social majority that may be burdensome to religious
minorities.7" He conceded that preventative measures could be
appropriate remedial measures, but added famously, "there must
be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved." 4 Justice Kennedy then declared, "RFRA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior."75 Boerne thus answered the question
of whether Congress has the power under Section 5 to determine
the substance
of constitutional amendments with a resounding
no. 76
The Court narrowly defined Congress' Section 5 powers again
77
in United States v. Morrison,
when it held that neither the
Commerce Clause nor Section 5 granted Congress the power to
create a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence. 8
Under its Section 5 reasoning, the Court found that the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) attempted to regulate private
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'...
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 513.
71. Id. at 511.
72. Id. at 522-29. Though Boerne first articulated the "congruence and
proportionality" test, it never expressly overruled Morgan. See generally
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. Rather, Boerne distinguished the pervasiveness of
racial discrimination in the 1960s, with the limited religious discrimination on
the congressional record. Id. at 526-27, 530.
73. The Court noted that Jewish and Hmong persons are subject to
autopsies, which are against their religious beliefs. Id. at 531.
74. Id. at 530. The Fifth Circuit has rephrased this test as: the Court must
determine what type of constitutional violation the statute was passed to
prevent, and then the congressional record must demonstrate actual violations
large enough to justify the depth and breadth of the statute. Kazmier v.
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000).
75. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
76. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 63, at 11 (answering this question
in the First Amendment context of Boerne).
77. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
78. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. Christy Brzonkala argued she was raped by
two Virginia Tech football players, including the defendant Morrison. Id. She
sued under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which created
a private cause of action for crimes of violence motivated by gender. Id. at
604. Congress expressly declared that §13981 was enacted pursuant to its
Section 5 and Section 8 powers. Id. at 607. The Court recognized that
Congress had thoroughly documented the societal costs of gender-motivated
violence. Id. at 620.
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conduct, while the Fourteenth Amendment only authorized
Congress to regulate state action.7 9 Morrison argued that since
several states were derelict in their duties to protect sexual
assault victims, the Violence Against Women Act was
"appropriate" federal protection; the Court rejected this
argument.0 It concluded that because the VAWA's remedy was
directed at private actors, it was not "corrective in its character,
adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited
state laws or proceedings of state officers.""1
D. The Complex, Evolving Relationship Between Section 5 and the
Eleventh Amendment in Two Recent Anti-DiscriminationCases
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for
evaluating Congress' authority to abrogate sovereign immunity:
(1) did Congress intend to abrogate the states' immunity,8 2 and (2)
did Congress validly exercise its power in doing so?83 In 2000, the
Court applied this framework in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents.'4
Justice O'Connor's opinion found that the Age
M
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)8
proscribed little
79. Id. at 626. Brzonkala tried to argue, based on dictum in the earlier case
of United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), that the Fourteenth
Amendment could reach private actors, but the Court explicitly rejected this
argument. Id. at 623-24.
80. The argument in Morrison was not that the black letter laws of the
states were discriminatory, but that some states were discriminatorily
administering their laws. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20.
81. Id. at 625.
82. Intent can be express or implied. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 43840. The Court, however, is reluctant to find implied intent to abrogate. Id. at
438.
Congress' intent must usually be "an unequivocal expression of
congressional intent to 'overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of
the several States."' Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scalon, 473 U.S. 234, 240
(1985).
A state can waive its immunity, even though in theory, immunity is a
bar on subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 239-40. A waiver must be "stated 'by
the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."' Id. A state
may consent to being sued in its own courts, yet not waive its immunity in
federal court. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 432. When acting pursuant to
its Section 5 authority, Congress abrogates the states' right of immunity in
either court system. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238.
83. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55.
The Boerne congruence and
proportionality test falls under this power analysis. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at
530 (explaining the two prongs of this test).
84. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). This Comment focuses on understanding Hibbs in
relation to Garrett and Kimel because all three opinions involve federal antidiscrimination laws.
85. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000). This Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, terminating, or
otherwise discriminating against, a person in terms of pay or employment on
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unconstitutional conduct and failed the "congruence and
proportionality" test of Boerne.8" The Court found that Congress'
intent to abrogate was clear,87 but it put the burden on Congress to
justify, with evidence, its conclusion that states were
unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of age, so as to
prove that the ADEA was truly remedial.' The Court ruled that
Congress' showing was subject to rational basis review, and it
found the provision of the ADEA subjecting the states to suit "so
unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that [the Court] can only conclude that the
[government's] actions were irrational."8 9 Remarkably, O'Connor
labeled the ADEA an "unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem.'
The following year, the Court again sided with the states in
91
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.
Patricia Garrett worked as the Director of Nursing at the
University of Alabama's Birmingham Hospital when doctors
diagnosed her with breast cancer in 1994.92 After leaving the
Hospital for a year to battle the disease, she returned to work only
to find that she had been demoted from her position as Director of
Nursing to "nurse manager," a lower paying position.93 Garrett
sued the University, seeking money damages under Title I of the
Though, again,
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'
congressional intent to abrogate the states' immunity was clear,
the Supreme Court held that the states could not be haled into
court for violating the ADA because Title I failed the Court's
"congruence and proportionality" test.95 Thus, despite a plethora
the basis of age. Id. § 623. Most of the provisions in this Act protect only
individuals who are at least forty years old. Id. § 631. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at
66 (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). In its definition of "employer," Congress
included states, state agencies, or subdivisions of the State. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(2000). One caveat to this statute is that an employer may discriminate on
the basis of age, if age is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." Id. § 623(f)(1).
86. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
87. Id. at 75-78.
88. In its analysis, the Court examined the ADEA's legislative history. Id.
at 89-91. It found Congress' reliance upon newspaper articles, letters from the
states, and a 1966 report on age discrimination in California an inadequate
basis to on which subject the states to suit for violations of the ADEA. Id.
89. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (applying the rational basis test, which
§ 623(a)(1) of the ADEA failed).
90. Id. at 89.
91. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).

92. Id. at 362.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 374. Attorneys for the State of Alabama argued the ADA was

unnecessary because "all 50 states have their own anti-discrimination laws."

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:599

of evidence to the contrary, the Court concluded that the evil of
state-sponsored discrimination against persons with disabilities
was not so pervasive as to permit Congress to remedy its effects by
subjecting states to suit.9
III. ANALYSIS
A. A New Quirk in Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence: Hibbs
The most recent sovereign immunity decision is Nevada
Departmentof Human Resources v. Hibbs.97 At issue in Hibbs was
whether Congress' enactment of the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993,9 which allows employees to take up to twelve weeks
paid leave to care for a sick family member or a newborn, was
enforceable against a state should it fail to honor the Act.9 In
Geraldine Sealey, Court Hears Disability Case: Justices Weigh States' Rights
2001)
available
at
Civil
Rights
(Oct.
11,
vs.
(last visited
abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/scouts-ada001011.html
Nov. 1, 2002).
96. See infra note 107 (discussing congressional findings in Garrett). In
reaching this conclusion, the Garrett court arguably applied a strict scrutiny
review under the guise of a rational basis test. See Melissa Hart, Conflating
Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "StrictScrutiny"
of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1091, 1105 (2001) (writing "by restraining Congress' authority, the Court
has given itself an unrestrained role, in which legislation whose subject would
receive limited judicial review were it passed by a state, will receive the
strictest scrutiny when passed by the federal government"). Compare Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 with Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (writing in Boerne, "While the
line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies,
the distinction exists and must be observed.").
97. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). Hibbs was an employee of the State of Nevada
when he requested leave, under the FMLA, to care for his wife as she
recovered from a car accident and resulting surgery. Id. at 1976. The Nevada
Department of Human Resources granted Hibbs' request for twelve weeks of
leave, but later informed Hibbs that he had exhausted his leave and must
return to work. Id. Hibbs did not return to work, was fired, and sued Nevada
under the FMLA. Id. The State argued that it was immune from suit under a
broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and under a narrow
construction of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Brief for the Petitioner, Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No. 01-1368). Hibbs argued not with the Court's
century-long interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but rather, that the
FMLA was a "carefully crafted ... remedy" which met the Court's rigorous
congruent and proportional test. Brief for Respondent William Hibbs at "1115, Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No. 01-1368).
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
99. Id. § 2612(a)(1). Under the FMLA, an annual twelve weeks of leave are
permitted:
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1993 Congress enacted the FMLA, with an express intent to
remedy the gender discrimination in the workplace that results
from the expectation that women bear a disproportionate share of
caring for their families."0° The family leave provisions of the
FMLA applied equally to qualified male and female employees.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the
circuits regarding Congress' power to open the states to suits for
violation of the FMLA. °2 In evaluating Hibbs' case, the Supreme
Court found that because the FMLA involved gender
discrimination, it warranted heightened scrutiny. 3' The Court
then accepted Congress' findings of state-based discriminatory
policies, found that the states could not overcome their burden of
justifying these policies, and concluded that the FMLA was valid
Section 5 legislation. '
B. Public Policies Underlyingthe Court'sDecision in Hibbs
The most
can reconcile
similarities in
Hibbs Court's
discrimination

perplexing question Hibbs raises is how the Court
its opinion with Garrett and Kimel, given the
the legislative records among these cases. The
answer is that state policies evidencing gender
are subject to intermediate scrutiny. °5 However,

(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in
order to care for such son or daughter;
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee
for adoption or foster care;
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of
the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious
health condition;
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform functions of the position of such employee.
Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000). Congress' reasoning was that employers are
sometimes reluctant to hire women for fear that they will become pregnant
and want to stay home with their children. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 528
(noting that this legislation may have the unintended effect of reinforcing such
fears).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2000) (indicating that both fathers and
mothers should be available to "participate in early childrearing").
102. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976.
103. Id. at 1978.
104. Id. at 1978-81. The Ninth Circuit had previously held the FMLA was
valid section 5 legislation. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 870
(9th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit in Kazmier, reached the opposite conclusion.
Kamizer, 225 F.3d at 528. The Kazmier court applied Kimel and found that
Congress intended to abrogate the states' immunity, but that it lacked this
power. Id. at 528. The Kazmier Court considered 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(C)
under a congruent and proportional analysis, then evaluated U.S.C.
§§ 2612(a)(1)(D) under the same test. Id. at 525.
105. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978. Intermediate scrutiny review asks whether
the statute addresses "important governmental objectives" and whether the
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Hibbs' case concerned care for his wife, not gender discrimination;
the Court could therefore have applied its traditional rational
basis review."' Instead of taking a hostile look at congressionally
assembled evidence of gender discrimination, the Court showed
more deference to Congress than its earlier sovereign immunity
decisions.1 7 It is puzzling that the Court, given its trend toward
states' rights, suddenly deviated from its states' rights opinions.
This Comment suggests that Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
the only Justices who made an unpredictable shift in this case,
were persuaded to allow Congress to abrogate the states'
immunity under the FMLA on public policy grounds.'
Justice Rehnquist has long discussed the enhancement of
states' rights as an important and desirable goal. 9 Some may
argue that Justice Rehnquist's and O'Connor's positions softened
in response to scholarly criticism that the Court's sovereign
immunity decisions were harming Congress' ability to enact
meaningful equal protection laws."0 Others may argue that the
means employed are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." Id.
106. Id. at 1981. Hibbs claim was brought under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
Id. at 1976. The Court could have followed Kazmier's approach and
considered separately the congruent and proportional basis for § 2612(a)(1)(A)
and § 2612(a)(1)(B). See supra note 104 (explaining that the Kazmier court
took such an approach).
107. Hibbs' analysis rests on the pervasiveness of state-sponsored gender
discrimination in the workplace. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978-80. Yet the
evidence in Hibbs does not differ significantly from that in Garrett. Congress'
findings of facts indicated that, "37 percent of surveyed private-sector
employees were covered by maternity leave polices, while only 18 percent were
covered by paternity leave policies." Id. at 1979. From this fact the Hibbs
Court quickly accepted the congressional conclusion that "the proportion and
construction of leave policies available to the public sector employees differs
little from those offered private sector employees.'" Id. at n.3. In contrast, in
Garrett,Justice Breyer's dissent observed, "There are roughly 300 examples of
discrimination by state governments themselves in the legislative record."
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added). Yet, despite these facts, the
Garrett Court reasoned that if the states employ over 4.5 million people, then
with only 300 examples, Congress "assembled only .

.

. minimal evidence of

unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disabled."
Id. at 370. Thus, Hibbs embraced congressional fact-finding in a way that
Garrettrejected the previous year.
108. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (explaining that Justice
Rehnquist typically supports state sovereignty).
William H. Rehnquist 1972-1986, 1986- , at
109. See, e.g.,
www.supremecourt
history.orgjustice/rehnquist.htm (giving a biography of Chief Justice
Rehnquist) (last visited Jaii. 3, 2004). One of his earliest discussions on
states' rights appeared forty-six years ago in a 1957 publication of U.S. News
& World Report, which critiqued the Warren Court. Id.
110. See Hart, supra note 96, at 1110 (arguing that the Court's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause will result in more arbitrary
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opposite conclusion is true: the Justices are not as committed to
pushing a states' rights agenda as some commentators have
suggested. 1 ' Some would likely take Hibbs at face value: that the
decision was truly an application of intermediate scrutiny to a case
involving gender discrimination, despite the fact that Hibbs was a
man attempting to care for his ill wife."'
This Comment argues that the Court generally considers
public policy in determining the outcome of sovereign immunity
cases. One factor that the Court likely considered in Hibbs was
the ease of administration of the FMLA's remedy. The FMLA's
discrimination); Sylvia A. Law, William Howard Taft Lecture: In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 432 (2002) (arguing that the Court's federalism cases
from 1996 until 2002 "reflect skepticism or even hostility to protection of
workers and civil rights"); Evan H. Caminker, Symposium: Shifting the
Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign
Immunity: "Appropriate"Means-End Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1199 (2001) (concluding that the Court's analysis of
Section 5 powers fails to explain why Congress cannot be the proper branch to
determine reasonable legislation, and that the Court's decision ties the hands
of courts presented with state misconduct); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 526 (2000) (concluding that the
congruence and proportionality test is too strong a critique of antidiscrimination law, and that the Court's use of this test demeans Congress'
participation in developing Equal Protection laws); Samuel Estreicher &
Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison and the Future of
Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 173 (2000)
(concluding that the Court's congruence and proportionality test is
unnecessary scrutiny of congressional means chosen to pursue a constitutional
end); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Comment:
Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARv. L. REV. 153, 194-95 (1997) (concluding that the Court erred in
disregarding Congress' robust interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in
Boerne, and suggesting the Court should instead provide a "presumption of
constitutionality - to the interpretive judgments of Congress").
111. See Colker & Brudney's critique discussed infra note 141 (regarding the
Court's "crystal ball" analysis).
112. At least one scholar has suggested that there is a marked distinction
between the standard of review the Court claims to apply and the one it
actually applies. See Hart, supra note 96 and accompanying text (arguing
that the Court has given itself an unrestrained role in evaluating legislation).
It is interesting to note, as does Justice Kennedy's dissent in Hibbs,
that the Court fails to apply its own tests of asking whether there is a specific
pattern of unconstitutional state action, as opposed to private conduct, and
then whether the congressional act is "congruent and proportional" to the
alleged constitutional violation. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. at 1991-92 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). One likely explanation for the absence of this test is that it is too
rigorous for Hibbs' case to survive, because twelve weeks of paid family leave
appears to create a substantive right. See id. at 1992 (characterizing the
FMLA as creating a "substantive entitlement program") (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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remedy of twelve weeks of leave annually is merely temporary,
in contrast with Kimel, whose remedy, indefinite employment,
was
4
likely more cumbersome for an employer to accommodate.1
Another factor that the Hibbs Court likely considered was
whether subjecting the states to suit for violating the FMLA would
create an unmanageable amount of litigation. This theory would
reconcile Garrett with Hibbs. Hibbs directly affects over 4.8
million state employees and their families." 5 Though it is hard to
state precisely how many disabled persons are affected by Garrett,
a whopping 43 to 160 million persons are classified as disabled,
depending on the definition of "disability." 6 It is hard to state
what percentage of persons with disabilities are employed by the
state or have been discriminated against in seeking state-based
employment, but the potential for overwhelming the federal courts
seems real."7 Additionally, claims of gender discrimination may
take aim at written policies regarding family leave, some of which
are incorporated into employee handbooks."'
Discrimination
based on age or disability, in contrast, may be more subtle and
subjective, and suits to determine its existence may require an
attempt to get into the mind of the employer, a difficult and
unpopular task."9
C. The Big Picture: A Suggested Directionfor Future Sovereign
Immunity Cases
The Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions raise
fundamental questions about the scope of the Court's "new
federalism" and whether it embodies desirable policy. This
113. Id. at 1976.
114. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67 (indicating that equitable relief is available
under 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2000)).
115. See Landau, supra note 18, at 171 (noting that "[sitate governments
employ over 4.8 million people").
116. Warren Richey, A Narrower Definition of "Disabled," available at
http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/1999/06/23/p4s2.htm
(June 23, 1999)
(last visited Jan. 3, 2004).
117. See id. (discussing fear of frivolous lawsuits, such as plaintiffs who wear
glasses suing for disability discrimination). See also Census Brief infra note
126 (noting that as many as one in five Americans have some sort of
disability).
118. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980 (discussing facially valid leave policies
being applied in a discriminatory manner).
119. See David A. Rutter, Title VII Retaliation, A Unique Breed, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 925 (2003) (reviewing Seventh Circuit employment

discrimination cases in 2002 and discussing the subtleties therein). The Court
in Tennessee v. Lane, discussed infra note 1, will likely base its opinion on

underlying public policy. However, because Lane is arguing that Tennessee
violated his Due Process rights, the Court will give less weight to the factors
discussed in this analysis, and will base its opinions on a bigger picture of
society, democracy, and federalism.
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Comment argues that Hibbs was correctly decided and should be
extended to future sovereign immunity cases. It also argues there
are four problems with the Court's congruence and proportionality
limitation of Congress' Section 5 powers, which Hibbs avoids.
First, this test prevents Congress from enforcing the Equal
Protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 ' Second, the
Court puts states' dignity above the fundamental rights of
citizens.12' Third, the test, as Justice Breyer argued, so critically
reviews the legislative history of the act in question that it reduces
Congress to a lesser governmental body.'
Fourth, it purports to
encourage state action, while diminishing the extent of the social
evil at issue, thereby encouraging certain states not to prevent,
deter, or remedy discrimination within their own borders.'
1. Congress Cannot Provide Equal ProtectionWithout Creating
Adequate Remedies
Several scholars argue the Court's recent sovereign immunity
decisions severely hinder Congress' ability to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Some scholars
believe the Equal Protection Clause, "perhaps more than most
constitutional guarantees, is tied in complex ways to evolving and
contested social norms,"'25 thereby making it more appropriate for
an elected body like Congress, not the Court, to represent the
current voice of the people.'26 Justice Stevens argued in Kimel that
120. See infra notes 124-137 and accompanying text (arguing that if
Congress cannot create adequate remedies for social problems, there can be no
equal protection under the law).
121. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text (arguing that the
fundamental rights of citizens are more important than states' rights).
122. See infra notes 141-149 and accompanying text (arguing that the level
of judicial scrutiny applied to Acts of Congress diminishes Congress'
importance).
123. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (arguing that the
Court's decisions discourage states from attempting to solve social problems).
124. See Hart,supra note 96, at 1105 (writing, "federalism does not supply a
logical, principled justification for the Court's approach in these cases"); Law,
supra note 110, at 396 (writing "A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
is to promote equality. The new federalism, as a radical attempt to undermine
this constitutional commitment to fairness and basic dignity, is disturbing as
a matter of principle and doctrine.").
125. Post & Siegel, supra note 110, at 513. The Court frequently relates
equal protections to the interpretation of social norms. Id. at 514. One
example of this is asking whether classifications based on gender are
"outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females." Id.
126. State employees, about five million in number, are the most affected by
the FLSA, ADA, ADEA, and the FMLA. Landau, supra note 18, at 169.
Persons with disabilities are also strongly affected by these decisions. The
Census believes that 9 million individuals have disabilities so severe that they
depend on special attention to complete everyday functions. Census Brief 97-
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Congress' right to remedy violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment flows naturally from Congress' right to create
substantive legislation."'
The public sector, like the private sector, engages in unlawful
age, gender, and disability discrimination.'
As such, Congress
should be able to set certain minimum standards for the public
sector, and the states should be able to provide stronger
protections if they so desire.'29 Under this approach Congress and
the Court could work together to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, instead of following the Court's position, which pits the
states against Congress in terms of authority to abrogate
immunity.'
Then the relationship between Congress and the
Supreme Court could, once again, be considered "fluid and
dynamic.
In contrast, the Court's pre-Hibbs analysis of sovereign
immunity
cases
required
such
detailed
evidence
of
unconstitutional state conduct that even popular, bipartisan-

5, DisabilitiesAffect One Fifth of All Americans: Proportion Could Increase in
Coming
Decades
(Dec.
1997),
available
at
www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2004).
Unemployment rates for persons with disabilities have been estimated to be
as high as 70 percent. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 653, 655 (2000).
127. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97.
128. The Congress that enacted the ADA wanted to learn why the states
employed so few persons with disabilities, and ordered the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to conduct an
investigation. Brief for Respondents Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash at *20,
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240). The
agency found that over 80% of state officials believed negative attitudes about
persons with disabilities explained why so few individuals with disabilities
worked as state employees. Id. When asked to explain in their own words,
state officials noted: "feelings of discomfort" in socializing with individuals
with disabilities, "inaccurate assessments of their productivity," and the
"prominence of these attitudes and the difficulty in changing them." Id. at 21.
129. The ADA generally defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (2000). Some states offer greater protection by broadening their
definitions of "employer." California, for example, defines "employer" as any
person employing five or more people. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(d) (West
2004). Another example of broader protection offered by a state is California's
definition of "medical condition," which encompasses persons with certain
genetic traits or with a history of cancer, while the ADA does not expressly
protect these persons without a showing of an impairment that "substantially
limits one or more major life activities." Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(h)
(West 2004) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
130. See NOONAN, supra note 11, at 134 (noting that there is "'no general
doctrine' that the power of Congress and of the states could not overlap").
131. See Post & Siegel supra note 110, at 446 (characterizing the
relationship between Congress and in the Court in the 1950s).
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supported legislation must be tediously redrafted to comply with
the Court's high standards.132
It is hard to tell how much
redrafting must be done to the ADA to comply with the Court's
standards,' 133 but Morgan and Hibbs provide two cases of valid
Section 5 legislation.' The ultimate question for future sovereign
immunity decisions, however, is whether Congress can achieve the
Morgan or Hibbs result outside of legislation designed to remedy
race or gender discrimination. One may argue that Congress can
address less pervasive social problems by simply enacting more
narrow legislation, but there is nothing outside of Hibbs to suggest
that the Court will not revert to its hostile analysis of
congressional fact-finding. Kimel recognizes Congress' Section 5
power as permission to prevent violation of civil rights "by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct," " and Hibbs
adds that Congress may sometimes enact prophylactic legislation,
but gives little guidance as to when this prophylactic legislation
will pass constitutional scrutiny. 3 ' At least one scholar believes
that with strong enough fact finding, Congress
may overcome the
137
Section 5 test further defined in Kimel.

132. But see Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 80, 85-86 (2001) (writing that the Court "applies a legal standard for
review that even a detailed legislative record could not possibly satisfy").
133. One scholar argues that congressional findings are merely "boilerplate"
language. Rotunda, supra note 7, at 885 n.77. This argument, however, fails
to explain what prompted congressional legislation. As Justice Stevens wrote,
"Whenever Congress passes a statute, it does so against the background of
state law already in place; the propriety of taking national action is thus
measured by the metric of the existing state norms that Congress seeks to
supplement or supplant." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 94. For example, when Congress
amended the ADEA to apply to public employers, twenty-four states'
discrimination laws did not afford this protection. Id. at 94 n.2.
134. See Rotunda, supra note 7, at 871 n.4 (finding Morgan still good law).
One may argue that it is unrealistic to think that Congress may change the
Supreme Court's stance in, for example, Garrett, by redrafting its legislative
findings.
However, if at the heart of the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence is the belief that Congress has gone too far in legislating for the
general public without express constitutional authority, then congressional
compliance with the Court's tests may provide a "goodwill gesture" (for lack of
a better term) that may win an additional vote, perhaps by Justice Rehnquist
or Justice O'Connor. See Caminker, supra note 110, at 1198 (suggesting that
the Supreme Court's decisions are motivated by this belief).
135. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
136. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 (indicating that the circumstances
presented by this case justified prophylactic § 5 legislation). But see supra
note 96 and accompanying text (indicating that the circumstances presented
by Garrett did not justify prophylactic legislation).
137. Colker, supra note 126, at 669.
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2. Courts Should Value Citizens' Fundamental Rights Above the
States' Dignity
Typically, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and
O'Connor justify the congruence and proportionality test as
protective of the states' "dignity."138 This rationale has been
criticized as a tautology: since the states have immunity, they
have dignity, and since they have dignity, they ought to be
immune from suit.139 The Court's "dignity" analysis focuses solely
on the states' dignity while failing to expressly consider the
dignity of the citizens who are most affected by the Court's
decisions. An analysis of dignity may be warranted in the debate
over congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, but it must
give adequate consideration to the dignity of all the parties
involved. 4 '

138. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748-49 (discussing the dignity of states as
sovereign bodies). One would suspect that if the states' dignity were truly at
issue, the states themselves would be the first to voice their opinions in
sovereign immunity cases. In Garrett, however, fourteen states supported
Patricia Garrett. Brief of the States of Minnesota, Arizona, Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (No. 99-1240). On the other hand, only seven states sided with the
University of Alabama. Brief of Amici Curiae States of Hawaii, Arkansas,
Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee in Support of Petitioners, Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
Similarly, regarding the VAWA, thirty-eight state attorneys general expressed
concern that violence against women had become an issue requiring federal
attention and urged Congress to pass the VAWA, even though the states
traditionally regulated such conduct. Post & Siegel, supra note 110, at 479.
In drafting the VAWA, Congress was aware of constitutional violations in at
least twenty-one states regarding gender-targeted crime. Id.
In Hibbs, thirteen states filed an amicus brief in support of Nevada, but
only six states supported Hibbs. Compare Brief for the States of Alabama,
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No.
01-1368) with Brief of the States of New York, Connecticut, Illinois,
Minnesota, New Mexico, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No.
01-1368). Interestingly, in both Garrett and Hibbs, the Supreme Court ruled
against the position taken almost 2:1 by the states.
139. NOONAN, supra note 11, at 53.
140. Dignity is particularly an issue for people with disabilities. See Colker,
supra note 126, at 655-56 (discussing Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), as
protecting the dignity of people with disabilities).
As for other philosophical or emotional undertones, one scholar
suggests that the real issue is the Court's dissatisfaction with Congress'
understanding of the limitations of its power. See Caminker, supra note 110,
at 1198.
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3. The CourtHas Reduced Congress to an Administrative Agency
Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett argues that the majority is
"reviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative
agency record."1 ' Justice Breyer also criticizes the majority for
requiring Congress to justify its findings detail by detail, 4 2 which
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to Congress when
exercising its Section 5 power.'
Justice Breyer and certain
scholars find that the text of Section 5 delegates exclusive power
to Congress to enact legislation and therefore, Section 5's
"appropriate" standard is a minimal standard, not a restriction.1"
Yet one may argue that the Court is not even treating Congress as
respectfully as an administrative agency, since the Court
questions Congress' basic fact-finding. "
Columbia law professor Herbert Wechsler argues that
141. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376. Other scholars have made this observation.
See Colker & Brudney, supra note 132, at 83 (writing, "the Court has
undermined Congress's ability to decide for itself how and whether to create a
record in support of pending legislation"). Colker and Brudney criticize the
Court's "crystal ball" approach, which invalidates any statutory provisions
subjecting states to suit if Congress failed to document state-based rights
violations in a detailed legislative record, even though Congress had no notice
that the Court would require as much. Id. at 85. They also criticize the
Court's "phantom legislative history" approach, which refers to the Court's
focus on the legislative history and its application of a harsh standard of
review. Id. at 85-86.
142. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 380.
143. Id. at 383.
144. Id. at 377. Colker contrasts the beginning of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "No state shall" with the beginning language of § 5, "The
Congress shall have power" and concludes that the framer's intent was to
broaden Congress' powers through § 5. Colker, supra note 126, at 662.
Similarly, Justice Breyer views Section 5 as allowing Congress greater control,
which is desirable because "[ulnlke courts, Congress directly reflects public
attitudes and beliefs." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384. This reading would allow
Congress' power and the states' power to overlap. Congress could create
minimal standards, while the states could choose to offer more protection.
145. The Court's congruence and proportionality test for valid Section 5
legislation requires the Court to make judgments about the frequency and
severity of unlawful discrimination, which it is in no position to do. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (acknowledging
that the legislature is better able to address discrimination against persons
with disabilities than the judiciary); Post & Siegel, supra note 110, at 515
(writing, "The Court's authority to interpret the Equal Protection Clause ...
rests on a special kind of socially situated judgment, a capacity to discern
shifts in the ways Americans understand the practices and institutions that
organize American life"). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180, 195 (1997) (noting that when determining whether a statute is
constitutional, "'courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress'...
We owe Congress' findings deference in part
because the institution is 'far better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and
evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon' legislation questions.").
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Congress, though acting in a national capacity, also acts to protect
local interests with its votes.'46 Wechsler believes "the Court is on
weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the
Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states,
whose representatives control the legislative process."47 According
to Wechsler, due to the makeup of the House and Senate,
Congress will protect state interests more than state legislatures
will protect national interests.
Thus federal intervention into
state affairs is a matter best left to Congress.149
4. The Court's DecisionsDo Not EncourageState Action Because
They Disregardthe Pervasivenessof Social Problems
The Court's sovereign immunity rulings do not logically
compel the Court to minimize the extent to which state actors and
officials struggle with the same social ills found in the private
sector. It was unnecessary for Justice O'Connor in Kimel to refer
to age discrimination as a "perhaps inconsequential problem.""0
Garrett, as a whole, leads the reader to believe that despite the
evidence petitioners raised to the contrary, society provides
relatively the same opportunities for persons with disabilities as
for able-bodied employees. These opinions could have honestly
evaluated the shortcomings of state governments and challegned
the states to hold themselves to higher standards. However, other
than Hibbs, the Court's sovereign immunity opinions never truly
pause to explain why Congress expressly considered statesponsored discrimination in drafting its laws.'
146. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 548 (1954).
147. Id. at 559.
148. Id. at 547. Though Congress' goal is to discern the nation's voice, it is
cognizant of local sensitivities. Id. Wechsler writes, "A local spirit will
infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress than a national
spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States." Id. Other
scholars support Wechsler's view, believing that an aggressive judicial branch
risks becoming a "super legislature." Post & Siegel, supra note 110, at 464.
Justice Breyer expresses similar concern in his dissent in Garrett,531 U.S. at
384.
149. Wechsler, supra note 146, at 559. In making this argument, Wechsler
distinguishes between the judiciary's role as interpreting the Constitution visA-vis federalism. Id. at 560 n.59. He also believes that the burden of

persuasion ought to fall on those advocating national action. Id. at 545.
150. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
151. See Post & Siegel, supra note 110, at 522 (writing, "Neither Kimel nor
Morrison endeavors sympathetically to reconstruct and address the equalitybased concerns that led Congress to enact the invalidating provisions of the
ADEA and VAWA."). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hibbs did not
question Congress' underlying conclusion that workplace discrimination based

on gender violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human
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IV. PROPOSAL
Congress can pursue three different means 52 to diminish the
impact of the new federalism cases prior to Hibbs: amend the
Constitution to give Congress the express authority to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity in civil rights cases,"' use
conditional spending to give the federal government more
control,TM or continue to attempt abrogation through Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment by working within the current
This Comment proposes working within
analytical framework.'
the current analytical framework, and a modest reliance on
Congress' granting of federal funds to the states, conditioned upon
their waiver of immunity, in order to restore a proper balance
between states' rights and the protection of individual liberties.
A.

ConstitutionalAmendment

The primary objections to the idea of a constitutional
amendment have been its difficulty," and the reluctance of the
Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854-55 (2001) (discussing gender discrimination and leave
policy in the workplace). It also did not second-guess Congress' goal in
attempting to remedy gender discrimination in the workplace. Id. at 854. It
concluded that the "statute aims to remedy all these forms of discrimination
by setting a gender-neutral minimum standard for the granting of care-taking
leave." Id. at 855. The Court also found that gender differences are rarely
related to any legitimate state interest and that their use often times shows
"prejudice and antipathy." Id. at 856.
152. The three mentioned options would provide the most comprehensive
means to counteract the new federalism rulings, but this is not an exclusive
list. Parties may try to rely on state remedies; however, these remedies often
provide inferior protection. Landau, supra note 18, at 189. Union members,
as another option, may want to work waivers of immunity into their collective
bargaining agreements. Id. at 205.
Plaintiffs may also try to utilize Ex Parte Young, so long as the statute
a plaintiff wants to bring suit under expressly provides for injunctive relief.
Id. at 198. Plaintiffs must convince the Court that the statute avoids the
Seminole Tribe exception to Ex Parte Young: that when Congress includes in
a statute a detailed, remedial scheme, the omission of injunctive relief means
Congress did not intend for such relief to be available, and therefore it will not
be granted by the Court. Id.
153. See infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text (discussing the viability
of the Constitutional amendment option).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." Id.
155. Noonan identifies other possible congressional responses as
impeachment or reducing the salaries of the Justices, but concludes that these
options are "too heavy or too petty or too awkward." NOONAN, supra note 11,
at 140-41.
156. Id. at 143. Contra Casey L. Westover, The Twenty-Eighth Amendment:
Why the Constitution Should be Amended to Grant Congress the Power to
Legislate in Furtheranceof the General Welfare, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 327,
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states to put their fate in the hands of Congress.'
Any
amendment would have to be passed by two-thirds of the House
and Senate, and then ratified by three-fourths of the states."' If
the number of states filing amicus briefs is any indication of the
states' position on this issue, a constitutional amendment is
clearly lacking the requisite support." 9
B. ConditionalSpending
The second proposal, conditional spending, is a promising
option because courts recognize that Congress' taxing and
spending power is a broader, more exclusive grant of authority
than the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The
seminal case on conditional spending, South Dakota v. Dole,"'
ruled that Congress could condition receipt of federal highway
funds on states setting their minimum drinking ages at twentyone. 6 2
The Court gave four factors to test the validity of
conditional spending measures" First, while giving deference to
congressional judgment, the Court must determine if the condition
was imposed for "the general welfare." 4 Second, the condition
must be unambiguous, clearly indicating to the states the
consequences of their compliance or noncompliance with the
condition. 6' Third, the condition must be related to Congress'
interest in the nation-wide programs at issue.'
Fourth, the
provisions must be consistent with other constitutional
provisions.'67 The regulation also cannot be overly coercive.'
327 (2003) (proposing a Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution that
reads, "Congress shall have the power to legislate in furtherance of the
general welfare.").
157. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing states' positions
in amicus briefs).
158. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1. The Constitution authorizes amendment by a

convention by two-thirds of the state legislatures, then ratification by threefourths of the states. Id.
159. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing states' amicus

briefs).
160. Courts allow these conditions because states are not required to accept

the funds. E.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 857 (6th Cir.
2002) (noting that states choose to participate in Medicaid, and that Congress
may place conditions on the disbursement of Medicaid funds to those states).
It should be noted, however, that receipt of federal funds alone does not
automatically operate as a constructive waiver of a state's sovereign
immunity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
161. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

212.
207-08.
207.
208.
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There are two objections to reliance solely on conditional
spending measures. First, they are expensive. 9 The amount of
money that the federal government is willing to offer the states
must be large enough to persuade the states to implement a policy
to which they are adverse.'
The second problem is that the Court
may limit Congress' ability to use federal funds to accomplish
indirectly what it was unable to accomplish directly.'71
To
accomplish this end, the Court may narrowly construe the phrase
"related to Congress' interest" under the fourth factor. The Court
7
could also easily dub the condition overly coercive. '
C. Working Within the Current Framework

Similar to the constitutional amendment option, working
with the current analytical framework has been given little
consideration. This Comment suggests, and Hibbs demonstrates,
that the current framework is not as impossible to work with as
some scholars have suggested.'
The Court's sovereign immunity
decisions, taken as a whole, tell us the Court is not persuaded that
state violations of equal protection rights are truly egregious
enough to require abrogating states' immunity.74 Although it can
168. Id.
169. The federal government spent over $195 billion in 1993 on federal
grants. Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending After Lopez, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911, 1918 n.24 (1995). None of these grants were offered without
conditions attached. Id. at 1918. In 1991, federal grants were approximately
twenty percent of state and local revenue. Id. at 1918 n.24.
170. See id. at 1917 (noting federal statutes that gives states financial
incentives to comply with radioactive waste disposal regulations and to raise
the legal drinking age to twenty-one).
171. Id. at 1919-20.
172. Noonan suggests the Court may attempt to limit conditions attached to
federal funds by "distinguishing the germane from the ungermane conditions,
and voiding the latter." NOONAN, supra note 11, at 142. However, this is
mere speculation, and the Dole Court was unable to provide a case in which it
found a conditional federal grant of money to the states to be unconstitutional.
Baker, supra note 169, at 1930.
173. Colker and Brudney, for example, interpret Garrett as requiring the
following:
Congress would presumably have to gather all the information itself
through its own committee hearings, without reliance on state or locallevel organizations or people who live in the respective States to gather
the information themselves. Congress also would have to insist that the
testimony was so stark that the published hearings could be tantamount
to evidence usable in future constitutional litigation against the States.
Colker & Brudney, supra note 132, at 142. However, the only citation given
for this reference is the requirement in Garrett that the Court document
patterns of discrimination. Id. at 142 n.261. Garrettdoes not have to be read
as a requirement that Congress act without help from other agencies. See
generally Garrett,531 U.S. at 356.
174. Justice Rehnquist terms the number of congressionally-assembled,
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be argued, as Justice Breyer did, that Congress should not bear
the burden of having to rewrite legislation to conform to the
majority's analysis, " 5 there is nothing in Garrett to indicate that
such rewriting could not meet the congruence and proportionality
test. Practicing attorneys, however, would be well-advised not to
rely solely on the Court's tests when drafting their arguments, but
also to appeal to the policies underlying Hibbs:
ease of
administration of the remedy and the desire to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
It is premature to argue that all legislation that attempts to
abrogate states' immunity is doomed to fail under this framework.
Congress is now aware of the tests the Court will apply to such
legislation. Congress ought to at least attempt to cooperate with
the Court's new framework. Congress should realize that the
Court has made it clear that it will not be persuaded by anecdotal
evidence, generalities, questionable methods of research, or
manipulated statistics.'76 Garrett simply demanded that Congress
more thoroughly document the facts of actual state-sponsored
violations of civil rights.'77 This need not78be the impossible task
that some scholars have made it out to be.'
This Comment suggests that Congress may be more effective,
dollar per dollar, by sending the task force at work in Garrett back
to research and more fully document abuses than to, in essence,
bribe the states with conditional funding grants.7 9 Because
attempted compliance has not yet been fully explored, this
Comment further suggests that it is too early to abandon the
state-sponsored violations of the rights of persons with disabilities to be "half
a dozen." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
175. See id. at 380 (noting that the Court now seems to require Congress to
make very detailed findings of fact, and to categorize evidence very carefully).
176. Justice Rehnquist finds the laundry list at the end of the Garrett
opinion to be "so general and brief that no firm conclusions can be drawn." Id.
at 372 n.7.
177. The Garrett Court concluded that the numerous examples of
discrimination constituted only "minimal evidence of unconstitutional state
discrimination." Id. at 370 (emphasis added). In his dissent, however, Justice
Breyer found that Congress assembled evidence of "'massive, society-wide
discrimination against persons with disabilities." Id. at 377. Justice Breyer
points out that Congress relied upon "census data, national polls, and other
studies." Id. at 378. Neither argument presents a model of clarity to
Congress. These two perspectives demonstrate how different Justices looking
at the same evidence can come to dramatically different conclusions, and it
reminds the reader once again of the Court's boldness in invaliding a slough of
federal statutes that attempted to create uniform levels of responsibility in the
private and public sector. See note 22 (noting cases in which the Court struck
down these statutes).
178. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (interpreting the
requirements of the congruence and proportionality test).

179. Garrett,531 U.S. at 379.
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possibility that the congruent and proportionality framework
would invalidate all attempts at congressional abrogation of
states' immunity, and it is too early to deviate from the conditional
spending means which have proven fruitful.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has shown that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, on its face a jurisdictional bar on federal courts in a
limited situation, has led the Court to a series of opinions that
have narrowly interpreted congressional power to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause. The FMLA, at issue in Hibbs, is a rare
example of "appropriate" Section 5 legislation.
Hibbs
demonstrates that the Court is willing to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity because it believed that gender discrimination
in the workplace was pervasive, because suits against state
employers would not create an unmanageable amount of litigation,
and because gender discrimination laws can be administered with
ease to an employer.
This Comment, in seeking to strike a balance between states'
rights and federal enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause,
makes the following recommendations: the Court should consider
applying Hibbs' deference to Congress in other sovereign
immunity cases. In addition to discussing the states' dignity, the
Court should give adequate consideration in its opinions to the
dignity of the victims of discrimination. The Court should draft its
opinions to encourage states to enact legislation that remedies
social ills. Congress should better document state violations and
amend statutes to meet the Court's standards. Finally, Congress
should utilize its conditional spending power to fill some of the
protective gaps left from the Courts' recent anti-discrimination
cases.

